哲学本身的既/又处境：the parallax status of philosophy as such
发布时间：2010-04-10 09:14
分类名称：默认分类
分类名称：默认分类
齐泽克认为，我们在哲学上如今也是处于一种多元文化主义那样的立场，这样行，那样也无不可，不理解，但支持，罗蒂称之为新的苦难、新的宽容、新的想象和新道德。学哲学成为扩展道德想象力这样一门事情。
This book is based on a strategic politico-philosophical decision to
designate this gap which separates the One from itself with the term parallax.9 There
is an entire series of the modes of parallax in different domains of modern theory:
quantum physics (the wave-particle duality); the parallax of neurobiology (the realization
that, when we look behind the face into the skull,we find nothing; “there’s no one at
home” there, just piles of gray matter—it is difficult to tarry with this gap between
meaning and the pure Real); the parallax of ontological difference, of the discord between
the ontic and the transcendental-ontological (we cannot reduce the ontological horizon
to its ontic “roots,” but neither can we deduce the ontic domain from the ontological
horizon; that is to say, transcendental constitution is not creation); the parallax
of the Real (the Lacanian Real has no positive-substantial consistency, it is just the gap
between the multitude of perspectives on it); the parallax nature of the gap between
desire and drive (let us imagine an individual trying to perform some simple manual
task—say, grab an object which repeatedly eludes him: the moment he changes his attitude,
starting to find pleasure in just repeating the failed task, squeezing the object
which, again and again, eludes him, he shifts from desire to drive);10 the parallax of
the unconscious (the lack of a common measure between the two aspects of Freud’s theoretical
edifice, interpretations of the formations of the unconscious [The Interpretation
of Dreams, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious] and theories
of drives [Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, and so on]); up to—last and least—the
parallax of the vagina (the shift from the ultimate object of sexual penetration, the embodiment
of the mystery of sexuality, to the very organ of maternity [birth]).
And, last but not least,we should assert the parallax status of philosophy as such. At
its very inception (the Ionian pre-Socratics), philosophy emerged in the interstices of
substantial social communities, as the thought of those who were caught in a “parallax”
position, unable fully to identify with any of the positive social identities. In On
Tyranny, Leo Strauss answered the question “In what does philosophic politics consist?”
with:“In satisfying the city that the philosophers are not atheists, that they do not desecrate
everything sacred to the city, that they reverence what the city reverences, that
they are not subversives, in short that they are not irresponsible adventurers, but the
best citizens.”11 This, of course, is a defensive survival strategy to cover up the actual
7
subversive nature of philosophy. This crucial dimension is missing in Heidegger’s account:
how, from his beloved pre-Socratics onward, philosophizing involved an “impossible”
position displaced with regard to any communal identity, be it “economy”
(oikos, the household organization) or polis (the city-state). Like exchange according to
Marx, philosophy emerges in the interstices between different communities, in the fragile
space of exchange and circulation between them, a space which lacks any positive
identity. Is this not especially clear in the case of Descartes?
This book is based on a strategic politico-philosophical decision to
designate this gap which separates the One from itself with the term parallax.9 There
is an entire series of the modes of parallax in different domains of modern theory:
quantum physics (the wave-particle duality); the parallax of neurobiology (the realization
that, when we look behind the face into the skull,we find nothing; “there’s no one at
home” there, just piles of gray matter—it is difficult to tarry with this gap between
meaning and the pure Real); the parallax of ontological difference, of the discord between
the ontic and the transcendental-ontological (we cannot reduce the ontological horizon
to its ontic “roots,” but neither can we deduce the ontic domain from the ontological
horizon; that is to say, transcendental constitution is not creation); the parallax
of the Real (the Lacanian Real has no positive-substantial consistency, it is just the gap
between the multitude of perspectives on it); the parallax nature of the gap between
desire and drive (let us imagine an individual trying to perform some simple manual
task—say, grab an object which repeatedly eludes him: the moment he changes his attitude,
starting to find pleasure in just repeating the failed task, squeezing the object
which, again and again, eludes him, he shifts from desire to drive);10 the parallax of
the unconscious (the lack of a common measure between the two aspects of Freud’s theoretical
edifice, interpretations of the formations of the unconscious [The Interpretation
of Dreams, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious] and theories
of drives [Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, and so on]); up to—last and least—the
parallax of the vagina (the shift from the ultimate object of sexual penetration, the embodiment
of the mystery of sexuality, to the very organ of maternity [birth]).
And, last but not least,we should assert the parallax status of philosophy as such. At
its very inception (the Ionian pre-Socratics), philosophy emerged in the interstices of
substantial social communities, as the thought of those who were caught in a “parallax”
position, unable fully to identify with any of the positive social identities. In On
Tyranny, Leo Strauss answered the question “In what does philosophic politics consist?”
with:“In satisfying the city that the philosophers are not atheists, that they do not desecrate
everything sacred to the city, that they reverence what the city reverences, that
they are not subversives, in short that they are not irresponsible adventurers, but the
best citizens.”11 This, of course, is a defensive survival strategy to cover up the actual
7
subversive nature of philosophy. This crucial dimension is missing in Heidegger’s account:
how, from his beloved pre-Socratics onward, philosophizing involved an “impossible”
position displaced with regard to any communal identity, be it “economy”
(oikos, the household organization) or polis (the city-state). Like exchange according to
Marx, philosophy emerges in the interstices between different communities, in the fragile
space of exchange and circulation between them, a space which lacks any positive
identity. Is this not especially clear in the case of Descartes?
